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Abstract: Our target article argued that a genetically specified
Universal Grammar (UG), capturing arbitrary properties of
languages, is not tenable on evolutionary grounds, and that the
close fit between language and language learners arises because
language is shaped by the brain, rather than the reverse.
Few commentaries defend a genetically specified UG. Some
commentators argue that we underestimate the importance of
processes of cultural transmission; some propose additional
cognitive and brain mechanisms that may constrain language
and perhaps differentiate humans from nonhuman primates; and
others argue that we overstate or understate the case against
co-evolution of language genes. In engaging with these issues,
we suggest that a new synthesis concerning the relationship
between brains, genes, and language may be emerging.
R1. Introduction
In our target article, we argued for a number of potentially
highly controversial theses concerning the relationship
between human language and the cognitive and neural
systems that support it. Our starting point was Chomsky’s
(1965; 1980) bold proposal that a core concept in linguis-
tics and biology is Universal Grammar (UG). This species-
specific innate endowment comprises a set of universal
properties that allow language to develop in the mind
of the child in the same biologically determined fashion
that a chicken grows its wings. Crucially, the properties
of UG are construed as being arbitrary, that is, as having
no motivation in terms of how language functions (e.g.,
as a system for communication). It is from this perspective
that Chomsky sees linguistics as, first and foremost, a
branch of biology – because the nature of UG is presumed
to characterize, albeit at a high level of abstraction, the
structure of the brain mechanisms involved in language
acquisition (and to a lesser extent, language processing).
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UG therefore provides an explanation of the apparently
neat “fit” between the structure of human languages and
the processes of language acquisition. Children are able
to find the “right” linguistic regularities, even in the face
of linguistic data that might seem noisy and partial
(according to the “poverty of the stimulus” [POS] argu-
ment; Chomsky 1980), because the “right” linguistic prop-
erties are genetically built-in, as part of UG.
The Chomskyan viewpoint constitutes an extremely
strong hypothesis concerning the nature of language devel-
opment, and has attracted considerable controversy (e.g.,
Bates & MacWhinney 1987; Pullum & Scholz 2002;
Seidenberg 1997; Tomasello 2003; 2004). It is also a
strong hypothesis concerning the brain basis for language
and its genetic underpinnings, and here too there has been
much debate (e.g., Clark & Misyak, in press; Elman et al.
1996; Mu¨ller, in press). While UG may be challenged on
either of these grounds, or, indeed, concerning whether it
provides the right type of theoretical framework for under-
standing purely linguistic data (e.g., Croft 2001; Goldberg
2006; O’Grady 2005), we argued that the UG approach
runs theoretically aground when faced with the logical
problem of language evolution1: that there is no credible
account of how a genetically specified UG might have
evolved.
Any genetically based biological structure can arise from
two types of process: either through a process of (more or
less) gradual adaptation driven by selection pressure, or
through some non-adaptationist process, by which the
structure emerges by “accident.” In the target article, we
argued that neither story is viable for UG as conceived
in Chomsky’s framework. An adaptationist account of
UG cannot work, because language change is typically pre-
sumed to be far more rapid than genetic change. Hence,
the linguistic environment is a “moving target,” which
changes too quickly for a genetically based UG to track.
We also pointed out that the spread of human populations
creates a further problem. If the adaptationist story is
correct, each subpopulation would be expected to adapt
to the local linguistic environment, resulting in different
UGs across different populations. But such a conclusion
contradicts the assumption that UG captures universal
properties of human language. Finally, we argued that
the non-adaptationist viewpoint is ruled out because the
coincidence required to accidentally construct a system
of the intricacy and subtlety of UG is too extreme to be
credible, according to a simple information-theoretic
argument.
The target article put forward a different theoretical
viewpoint, which is challenged, amplified, and explored in
the highly stimulating commentaries to the article. In par-
ticular, we suggested that the fit between language learners
and the patterns observed in human languages – a fit which
appears to be required to explain how language learning is
possible – does not arise because languages are shaped
by an innate UG, genetically hardwired in the learner’s
brain. Instead, this fit arises because languages themselves
have adapted to be readily learned and processed. Rather
than construing the world’s languages as fixed and asking
how they are learnable, we proposed that it is more appro-
priate to consider languages as evolving systems, which have
many common patterns in part because they have adapted
to common selectional pressures from human learning and
processing mechanisms. From this viewpoint, the focus on
the genetic basis for language shifts from the search for
genes underpinning linguistic constraints, to understanding
the pre-existing neural and cognitive machinery on top of
which the cultural construction of language was possible.
In responding to the commentaries here, we suggest
that this viewpoint can be seen as part of a new theoretical
framework for understanding the relationship between
brains, genes, and language. We divide our discussion
into four broad, although interrelated, themes:
1. Rethinking classical UG. The commentaries, and the
wider current literature, indicate that theorists – except for
a few holdouts (Harnad) – are either working outside
(Goldberg;Hurford), or at minimum substantially recon-
ceptualizing, the classic UG framework (Barrett, Fran-
kenhuis, & Wilke [Barrett et al.]; Piattelli-Palmarini,
Hancock, & Bever [Piattelli-Palmarini et al.];
Reuland; Satterfield). Somewhat to our surprise,
there is relatively little argument to the effect that an evol-
utionary account can be offered for anything like classical
UG. Nonetheless, the commentators raise a range of
important issues concerning the possible innate basis for
language.
2. Too much emphasis on the brain? The issue here is:
How far can cultural learning of a system for communi-
cation explain language structure, independent of cognitive
and neural constraints? Some commentators focus on the
explanatory power of learning mechanisms (Catania),
while others emphasize the mechanisms of cultural trans-
mission (Blackmore; Caldwell; Smith, Kirby, & Smith
[Smith et al.]).
3. The biological and cognitive basis for language. A
diverse range of forces are identified, by which lan-
guage may have been shaped by the brain and beyond
(Aronoff, Meir, Padden & Sandler [Aronoff et al.];
Behme; Brooks & Ragir; Corballis; de Ruiter &
Levinson; Dessalles; Enfield; Fauconnier & Turner;
Goldberg; Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch; Landauer;
Lieberman; Namy & Nygaard; Tallerman; Toscano,
Perry, Mueller, Bean, Galle, & Samuelson [Toscano
et al.]; Wallentin & Frith). These proposals can also
be viewed as providing a range of potentially complemen-
tary perspectives concerning what crucial neural or cogni-
tive structures differentiate humans from nonhuman
primates.
4. When can genes and language co-evolve? The target
article makes a narrow argument: that a co-evolutionary,
adaptationist account of the origin of a genetic basis for
arbitrary linguistic constraints (as postulated in UG) is
not viable. A range of commentators consider whether
the assumptions of this argument apply, especially in
relation to the presumed speed of language change (Black-
more; Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch; Pagel & Atkin-
son) and level of selectional pressure (Behme); while
others suggest that the argument cannot go through more
generally (Barrett et al.; Blackmore; Fitch; Hurford),
or that our arguments can be expanded to argue even
against the possibility of the co-evolution of functionally
relevant linguistic regularities (Smith et al.).
In the following sections, we discuss these themes in
turn, and close by outlining open questions and challenges
for future research that are raised by the commentaries.
We conclude that the balance of the discussion suggests
that a new synthesis concerning the relationship between
brains, genes, and language may be emerging.
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R2. Rethinking classical UG
The centerpiece of our argument was that there is no cred-
ible evolutionary account for a genetically based UG, throw-
ing the classical conception of UG into difficulties. Many
commentators are, largely on independent grounds, happy
to accept that UG, as classically conceived, is not viable.
For example, Goldberg argues that the traditional con-
ception of UG should be replaced by an attempt to specify
the cognitive and neural prerequisites for language, noting
that recent advances in, among other things, the compu-
tational and psychological study of learning, require revisit-
ing arguments for UG. Indeed, Goldberg and several other
commentators (e.g., Hurford; Wallentin & Frith) note
that Chomsky’s own position can be read as rethinking the
classical UG viewpoint. Thus, Hauser et al. (2002) have, as
Goldberg notes, emphasized the importance of domain-
general mechanisms, raising the possibility that recursion
might be the only element of the “narrow faculty of lan-
guage” – that is, a genetically based process, which is
specific to language.
We agree with these commentators that, taken at face
value, this theoretical position does seem to require
letting go of core theoretical claims previously associated
with UG. Thismove has substantial theoretical implications:
It signals the need for a complete revision of the perspective
that the goal of linguistics is the characterization of UG; a
withdrawal of the claim that linguistics is a branch of
biology; and a departure from viewing language acquisition
as the “growth” of a language organ, whose blueprint is
specified by the genetic constraints that encode UG. It
seems, then, that Hauser et al.’s (2002) position is strongly
in tension with those contemporary theorists who are com-
mitted to the view that language acquisition must be
explained in terms of innate language-specific constraints,
both in meta-theoretic discussions in linguistics (Harnad;
Reuland; see also, e.g., Boeckx 2006) and accounts of
language acquisition (e.g., Crain & Pietroski 2006).
Even if the conventional UG picture is set aside, some
commentators suggest that there is, nonetheless, a role for
language-specific innate constraints of some kind, especially
in explaining how children can learn the enormously subtle
and intricate patterns in natural language. Thus, Satterfield
raises the point that a naive empiricist perspective on lan-
guage acquisition might be expected to mirror the adult
linguistic environment. But how, then, are systematic errors
in children’s speech to be explained? For example, how,
she asks, is it possible to explain that children brought up in
English-speaking linguistic environments frequently drop
subject pronouns in tensed clauses (Hyams 1986), even
though this is not observed in their linguistic environment?
Satterfield suggests that we must look to innate language-
specific biases to explain how this can occur. We agree
with Satterfield that biases may be needed to explain this
and other acquisition phenomena. However, whether such
biases are specific to language is, of course, an empirical
question. Indeed, recent analyses of children’s spontaneous
productions and computational modeling by Freudenthal
et al. (2007) suggest that the omission of subject pronouns
in English may be explained without recourse to language-
specific information, by a simple developmental model
incorporating cognitive processing constraints and which
gradually acquires grammatical knowledge from distribu-
tional information in child-directed speech.
Also focusing on the role of innate constraints, Reuland
provides a shortlist of requirements for an innately speci-
fied language acquisition system, going beyond theminimal
conception of UG as containing only recursion (Hauser
et al. 2002). These constraints appear highly language-
specific in nature, such as a checking operation to compare
linguistic features and a locality condition to restrict move-
ment, depending on linguistic domains. Moreover, even if,
in linewith theMinimalist Program,much of the priorwork
of classical UG is pushed into a parameterized lexicon, non-
lexical parameters are still needed in current versions
of minimalist theory (Baker 2001; Boeckx 2006). Thus,
despite the arguments put forward by Hauser et al.
(2002), current generative accounts of language in linguis-
tics appear to require UG to encompass considerably more
abstract, language-specific properties than just recursion
(at least given the current state of the Minimalist
Program). As a consequence, such accounts are therefore
vulnerable to the logical problem of language evolution
described in the target article.
One potential way of rethinking UG is to reconceptualize
it in more functional terms, which are outside the immedi-
ate scope of the arguments in the target article. Satterfield
suggests that UG be construed as a collection of domain-
general mechanisms that interact with language-specific
components to help resolve the purported POS problem
(see also Bever, in press). However, this perspective cannot
escape the logical problem of language evolution, because
of the arbitrary (i.e., nonfunctional) nature of the latter,
language-specific, part of this hybrid UG. Barrett et al.
push the reconceptualization of UG still further, proposing
to conceive it simply as whatever mechanisms have evolved
specifically for language – even if these should turn out to
be entirely functional in nature and thus diametrically
opposed to the claims of classical UG. As noted in the
target article, we agree that evolution may have led to adap-
tations for certain functional features of language – though,
as discussed further below, the extent of this is not clear
(Smith et al.).
In contrast to these adaptationist reconceptualizations of
UG, Harnad endorses our analyses of the problems facing
adaptationist explanations of UG and instead backs a non-
adaptationist account. However, as mentioned above and
in the target article, this type of explanation faces a difficult
dilemma. On the one hand, if UG is really so simple that
it can come about through “chance” (e.g., via a single
mutation), then it is not clear how it can resolve the pur-
ported POS problem, or other acquisition phenomena (as,
e.g., highlighted by Satterfield), which are typically viewed
as requiring rich language-specific innate constraints. On
the other hand, if UG is permitted to have the complexity
necessary to deal adequately with such acquisition issues
(as hypothesized by many generative approaches), then
the probability of such an intricate biological structure
emerging de novo through a single macro-mutation is
vanishingly small.
Also advocating a non-adaptationist perspective,Piattelli-
Palmarini et al. suggest that we have underplayed the
impact of the “evo-devo” revolution in biology for under-
standing how UG might have evolved by non-adaptationist
means. The evo-devo approach has shown that biological
evolution frequently exhibits the repetition and variation
of basic “modular” structures, typically underpinned by
common genetic machinery (Kirschner & Gerhart 2005).
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Could this be true for UG? Chomsky (e.g., 1980) repeat-
edly stressed how the structure of language differs funda-
mentally from that observed in other cognitive domains.
If this is right, it is very difficult to see how a unique,
complex, and fully functioning system might spring into
being as a minor variation of some existing cognitive struc-
ture. Similarly, if, as Piattelli-Palmarini et al.’s title appears
to suggest, the design of language arises from optimality
constraints, which might perhaps, as Chomsky (2005b)
has recently suggested, be analogous to the minimum prin-
ciples that give rise to soap bubbles and snowflakes, then it
is unclear why special-purpose biological machinery for
UG is theoretically necessary at all. In the target article,
we therefore argued that the emergence by non-adapta-
tionist means of a complex, functioning neural system
embodying UG is astronomically unlikely. Indeed, as we
read the literature, biological structures built de novo
appear invariably to be shaped by long periods of adap-
tation (Finlay 2007). Thus, while antennae may be a modi-
fication of the insect leg (Carroll 2005), it is not an insect
leg, or anything like one. It is exquisitely crafted to play
its new role – and such apparent design is universally
explainedwithin biology as an outcome ofDarwinian selec-
tion. The impact of evo-devo is to help us understand the
intricate structure and constraints of the space of organ-
isms over which the processes of variation and natural
selection unfold; it is not an alternative to the operation
of natural selection (Carroll 2001).
R3. Too much emphasis on the brain?
The title of our target article, “Language as shaped by the
brain,” embodies the claim that the brain, and the thought-
based, perceptuo-motor, cognitive, and socio-pragmatic
processes that it supports, plays a crucial role in determin-
ing the structure of natural language. Yet, as we pointed
out, the influence of these processes can take a wide
range of routes. Many of our commentators explore the
possibility that our emphasis on the brain may be excessive
(Catania); or that it should at minimum be supplemented
with an analysis of the selective forces on language gener-
ated by its communicative function, and its transmission
across networks of individuals (Brooks & Ragir; Smith
et al.; Wallentin & Frith). According to this latter view-
point, there may be regularities in language that can be
understood independently from the details of brain mech-
anisms. In general, a natural challenge to our perspective
on the evolution of language structure is to ask, from an
explanatory point of view: How much can be explained
by cultural transmission alone?
Catania suspects that, in using the brain to explain lin-
guistic behavior, we have the cart squarely before the
horse. Instead, he sees behavior as primary and argues
that human learning mechanisms may be flexible enough
to capture and reflect whatever patterns of behavior may
be required. He uses the analogy of categorical perception
(Liberman et al. 1957). While many theorists suggest that
categorical perception between phoneme boundaries may
arise from boundaries in the sensory input or the mechan-
isms of speech perception and/or production, Catania
contends that it may be more productive to propose that
such boundaries are not so constrained. Instead, the
specific boundaries observed in categorical perception in
different languages may be determined purely by the lin-
guistic environment (i.e., English vs. Arabic) – according
to this viewpoint, the brain is not shaping language, but
responding to the linguistic environment.
We suggest that this viewpoint is not adequate to explain
linguistic regularities in general, however, precisely because
it does not place constraints on the patterns of language that
are viable. The challenge of understanding language struc-
ture is to explain the structural regularities that the world’s
languages do, and do not, exhibit; and some of the key
sources of constraints are, we suggest, that languages must
be easy to learn (from limited amounts of data that are avail-
able to the child), that theymust be easy to process (e.g., lin-
guistic relations will typically be local, rather than involving
arbitrarily long and complex dependences between linguis-
tic items), and that theymust fit naturallywith the perceptual
and motor apparatus (language must be easy to decode, and
easy to produce).
A lack of focus on such constraints is, we suggest, also
evident in many meme-based accounts of cultural and
linguistic evolution, as exemplified in the commentary by
Blackmore. She suggests that language should be viewed
as a complex of memes; and that these memes propagate
in a selfishway – that is, the crucial factor in language evol-
ution is the replicative power ofmemes, independent of any
functional value that the memes may or may not have for
their “hosts,” that is, language users.We arewary of this per-
spective if taken to an extreme.We would agree that under-
standing which aspects of language structure will readily
be transferred from one generation of language users to
another is critical in understanding the selectional pressures
on languages. But we see the question of the learning and
processing biases of learners to be crucial in determining
what is, or is not, readily transferred. That is, which struc-
tures “replicate” depends critically on the nature of the
brains that propagate those structures via learning. Thus,
we see the selection pressures on language as arising, to a
large degree, from the properties of the brain.
Piattelli-Palmarini et al. appear to have mistaken
our approach for a meme-based account (such as Black-
more’s) and are concerned that viewing language as a
cultural productmeans that linguistic evolution is no differ-
ent, in principle, from the design of a Boeing 707. But,
of course, aircraft are typically products of directed
and determined efforts of design, typically by vast teams
of scientists and engineers. The process of the cultural con-
struction of language is, we suggest, a much more piece-
meal, distributed, and incidental matter. In specific
circumstances, with particular purposes in mind, people
attempt to communicate; and the layering of such attempts,
and their selective winnowing and replication, inadver-
tently creates a language, shaped by the brain. The putati-
vely worrying analogy with aircraft design therefore seems
remote at best.
More generally, a tendency to see processes of cultural
transmission as an alternative to, rather than as grounded
in, theories of brain and cognition occurs elsewhere in the
literature. For example, many properties of language are
viewed as arising from historical processes of language
change (such as grammaticalization); and such processes are
viewed as fairly independent of underlying brainmechanisms
(Bybee, in press). But we argue that processes of historical
language change depend crucially on the cognitive and
neural machinery of the speakers involved. Even if language
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is a cultural product, created by processes of cultural trans-
mission, it is nonetheless shaped by the brains that create
and transmit linguistic structure. The brain, and the cogni-
tive and learning constraints that it embodies, is centrally
important, after all. Brooks & Ragir generalize this line of
thought to cultural products more broadly, suggesting that
tool manufacture, music, and play are all likely to be
shaped by an interplay of factors governing cultural trans-
mission and the cognitive constraints of individual agents.
We shall discuss later on how far the arguments of our
target article, particularly concerning the non-viability of
nativism with respect to apparent universals, might apply
beyond language to other aspects of culture.
One way to study the interplay of constraints on learners
and the structure of the cultural transmission of language is
through the combination of computer simulations – where
both the “cognitivemachinery” of the learners and the struc-
ture of communicative interactions, including the structure
of the “social network” across which information is diffused,
can be directly manipulated. Smith et al. mention their
important work in this tradition, which we shall discuss in
detail later. A complementary approach is to study the diffu-
sion of information across human agents, as outlined by
Caldwell. She finds intriguing cases of “convergent evol-
ution” in problem-solving tasks, when solutions are passed
from “generation to generation” by gradual replacements
of group members. Here, the selectional pressure (the pre-
ference for one solution over others) results from explicit
reflection and discussion within the group, rather than the
presumably nonconscious biases that shape many aspects
of language evolution. Nonetheless, this work provides an
intriguing illustration of how the properties of learners
(here, their problem-solving abilities and biases) can lead
to systematic regularities, which may converge across
groups. Perhaps similarly, convergent evolution at the level
of language change might explain some common properties
across theworld’s languages. Thus, the interplay of computer
simulations and empirical research promises to be parti-
cularly fruitful for the investigation of such convergent
evolution.
R4. The biological and cognitive basis
of language
In the previous section (R3), we considered commentaries
that emphasize the importance of learning, communica-
tion, and properties of cultural transmission – but we
have stressed that these processes are grounded in the
properties of our cognitive and neural mechanisms. Here,
we consider commentaries for which those mechanisms
are the main focus. That is, we consider questions such
as: What are the cognitive pre-adaptations that make the
cultural construction of language possible?What is distinc-
tive about human cognition? And, more broadly, how is
language rooted in biology?
Before addressing these questions, it is important to dis-
tinguish themain points at issue, which concern the general
biological machinery that makes language possible (which,
it is typically assumed, is shared by all normally developing
humans), from the question of individual variation in lin-
guistic ability. Pagel & Atkinson rightly point out that
human linguistic abilities, like most human cognitive differ-
ences, are quite strongly heritable, implying that these
differences have a genetic basis. Such differences need
not, of course, be language-specific, but might reflect gene-
ral processing differences, such as variations in memory
(Landauer; see also, e.g., Ericsson & Kintsch 1995; Mac-
Donald & Christiansen 2002; Wynne & Coolidge 2008).
Moreover, “generalist” genes may explain a broad range of
learning abilities and disabilities (Kovas et al. 2007). In
the target article, however, the focus is not on genes that
vary between language users, but on the common genetic
basis, shared across the normally developing population,
that supports language acquisition and processing. The
range of suggestions concerning the key biological and cog-
nitive bases for language mentioned in the commentaries is
impressively broad.
De Ruiter & Levinson argue that the key driving force
behind language is communicative intelligence: a power-
ful pragmatic system for relating signals to communica-
tive intentions. They argue that this system arose prior to
language, and that this adaptation crucially distinguishes
the human brain from that of other primates (for a related
perspective, see Tomasello 2008). This approach provides
an elegant inversion of the assumptions common in nativist
perspectives on language acquisition. According to that
tradition, the distinctive features of the language organ
concern the abstract, structural properties of syntax and
phonology; pragmatic inference is typically assumed to be
continuous with general inference abilities (e.g., Fodor
1983), and hence not properly part of the language system
at all, let alone part of UG. Yet, de Ruiter & Levinson take
pragmatics to be the cognitively decisive mechanism for
the emergence of language; and Levinson (2000) suggests,
as we briefly described in the target article, that highly
specific and intricate structural patterns in language,
such as the binding constraints, emerge as a consequence.
This concrete example of how general communicative
factors can generate apparently highly arbitrary and com-
plex syntactic phenomena illustrates the potential value
of viewing language as adapted to the brain, rather than
the reverse. This case is perhaps particularly interesting,
given that binding constraints are often highlighted as par-
ticularly strong evidence for innate linguistic constraints
(Reuland).
Enfield makes a related argument, focusing instead on
theprimacy of the speech act, a pragmatic notion concerning
the unit over which communicative intentions are conveyed.
He argues that the structure of communication as a series of
conversational “moves and countermoves” may have strong
implications for the structure of grammar. Fauconnier &
Turner, by contrast, argue that human evolution may have
undergone a qualitative and decisive cognitive transition
involving the ability to engage in “double-scope blending.”
This ability permits the integrationof twodifferent represen-
tational frames, whichFauconnier&Turner take to underlie
the creation of not merely language but many aspects of
culture, from mathematics to religion. We suggest that the
complexity and variety of cognitive machinery that presum-
ably underlies the full range of cultural products, including
language, makes the existence of a single key transition
prima facie unlikely; but this bold possibility is certainly
worthy of consideration in principle.
Tallerman takes up a complementary line of reasoning,
in considering cross-linguistic regularities in case-marking
systems. She notes that case-marking tends to be highly “eco-
nomical” – that is, while a variety of possible linguistic cues
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may be used to signal case, cues are used only where necess-
ary to avoid ambiguity. Typically, overt case-marking only
applies to one member of an “opposition” (e.g., between
agent and patient); the identity of the non-marked case
may, presumably, be “filled in” by the listener using the
type of pragmatic inferences considered by de Ruiter &
Levinson. Tallerman’s account explains some of the
variety of case systems observed cross-linguistically, from a
purely functional standpoint (e.g., in terms of economy and
avoiding ambiguity). Her arguments thus provide a counter-
weight to Satterfield’s claim that innate knowledge of case
systems may have to be built into the learner. Clearly, chil-
dren are able to acquire case systems for natural language –
but thismay be explained because case systems have evolved
to be functionally effective, and, we suggest along with Tal-
lerman, readily learned and processed. Thus, case systems,
along with other linguistic regularities, will reflect whatever
learning and processing biases the cognitive system embo-
dies. But this match arises not because the learner has a
language-specific innate knowledge of the case system, but
instead because the case system has been selected to fit
language learners and users.
Wallentin & Frith take a different tack, developing an
intriguing argument. They first point out that perceptuo-
motor constraints are likely to be important in constraining
language, noting that imaging studies suggest that neural
representations of different classes of words are located
in corresponding brain areas (e.g., action words are often
associated with prefrontal cortex [Hauk et al. 2004], where-
as words representing spatial relations are associated with
posterior parietal cortex [Wallentin et al. 2006]). Nonethe-
less, they note that, in many areas of classification (e.g.,
color names), there is considerable variation across langua-
ges, even though color names appear to be driven, to some
extent at least, by considerations of perceptual optimality
(Regier et al. 2007). Wallentin & Frith suggest that this
may arise because the drive to align with other group
members may outweigh the drive to find an optimal classi-
fication. They suggest that the goodness of a classification
may partially be defined in terms of agreement with other
group members, which may potentially lead to a radical
and rapid runaway process. We suggest that such proces-
ses may be particularly likely where there is a large range
of alternative solutions, which are roughly equally “good”
from the point of view of the individual agent; and
especially when it is difficult to shift from one type of sol-
ution to another. Many of the arbitrary aspects of the
world’s languages, ranging from the inventory of phone-
mes, the variety of syntactic categories, to the functioning
of pronouns, seem to exhibit considerable variation. These
variants are, perhaps, roughly equally good solutions; and
moving between solutions is slow and difficult (although
historical linguistics does sometimes indicate that change
does occur between such forms; McMahon 1994). In
such cases, the selection pressure on language from the
brain imposes only a relatively weak constraint on the sol-
ution that is reached. Conversely, the functional pressure
for the emergence of other aspects of language, such as
double articulation (i.e., separate combinatorial layers of
phonological and syntactic structure) or large vocabulary
(Hurford) or compositionality (Smith et al.), may be so
strong that these factors are not disturbed by social forces.
Greenfield&Gillespie-Lynch also consider perceptual-
motor factors to be an important, but insufficient, starting
point for understanding language. They argue that the struc-
ture of actions may provide an infrastructure for linguistic
behavior (see, e.g., Byrne & Byrne [1993] on the complex
action sequences involved in field observations of gorilla
leaf-gathering). This infrastructure might be co-opted in
gestural communication. Yet, like Wallentin & Frith,
Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch argue that social factors are
likely to play a key additional role. They suggest that
mirror neurons, which are phylogenetically broad, may be
indicative of “intersubjectivity” (i.e., the sharing of mental
states by two or more people), and that this may be crucial
to language (as is indicated by, for example, work on joint
attention in developmental psychology; Eilan et al. 2005).
Mirror neurons appear to represent actions, whether per-
formed by the agent or merely observed; and, suggestively,
mirror neurons are located in what is arguably the homol-
ogue of Broca’s area, which is important for language in
humans. Differential expansion of language-related areas
in the human brain may, Greenfield & Gillespie-Lynch
suggest, indicate co-evolution of brain and language.
We suspect that such arguments may currently be prema-
ture. Although a number of experiments have been con-
ducted to investigate mirror neurons in humans, the
results remain unclear (for discussion, see Turella et al. in
press). Another caveat is that mirror neurons were originally
found in a nonhuman primate, and may even be present
across a wide range of species (Hurford 2004), indicating
thatmirror neuronsmay not be a key factor in language evol-
ution. Moreover, there are elegant statistical models that
accurately show the relationship between the differential
expansion of brain areas across a wide range of mammals.
These models reveal no notable expansion of Broca’s or
Wernicke’s area, as might be expected from selectional
pressure for language (Finlay et al. 2001). Although these
considerations caution against the specific scenario for
language evolution outlined by Greenfield & Gillespie-
Lynch, the argument of our target article does not deny
the possibility of brain-language co-evolution. Rather, the
logical problem of language evolution arises for arbitrary
properties of language – because, having no “functional”
anchors, these will tend to vary freely and rapidly, both
across time and across populations. This would lead to a
highly unstable linguistic environment, to which slow-chan-
ging language genes cannot readily adapt. But this specific
argument does not eliminate all possibility of co-evolution
between genes and behavior. For example, it is entirely com-
patible with our argument that better memory (Landauer)
or better pragmatic skills (de Ruiter & Levinson;Enfield;
Wallentin & Frith), might co-evolve with a language sys-
tem that draws upon these skills. We shall discuss these
issues inmore detail, as they arise throughout the commen-
taries, in section R5.
Lieberman has a different proposal concerning the key
neural circuitry underpinning language and a range of
other human-specific behaviors, such as dance and music.
He focuses on neural circuits creating bidirectional links
between the cortex and basal ganglia. As also noted in
the target article, the corticostriatal system is important
for the learning and processing of sequential information
(Packard & Knowlton 2002). Lieberman further argues
that “hard” data from molecular genetics and neuroima-
ging suggest that these neural circuits underpin our pro-
ductive syntactic capacity. For example, mutations in the
FOXP2 gene, which has been shown to be crucial to the
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development and function of the corticostriatal system (Lai
et al. 2003), give rise to severe speech and orofacial motor
problems (Lai et al. 2001; MacDermot et al. 2005). This
genetic link between sequential learning and language is
further underscored by recent results showing that
common allelic variation in FOXP2 is associated with indi-
vidual differences in performance on a sequence-learning
task, which, in turn, is related to language ability (Tomblin
et al. 2007). Thus, genetic research relating to brain devel-
opment can readily be incorporated into the new synthesis
proposed here, providing insights into the nature of the
neural constraints that shape language evolution.
Emphasizing the importance of constraints arising from
the human body, Aronoff et al. andCorballis explore the
contribution of gesture to language evolution. Indeed,
Corballis sees gesture as the origin of language, arguing
that early languages may have been signed, rather than
spoken. He argues that the scenario for language evolution
outlined in the target article is compatible with a gestural
origin of language. We see this as an important possibility.
It is certainly conceivable that early language – as a cul-
tural product – might equally well have been shaped by
the mechanisms involved in the production and interpret-
ation of gestures as those used for vocalizations. Research
on modern apes suggests that vocal and manual gestures
might initially have proceeded in parallel, perhaps with a
more flexible use of gestures (Pollick & de Waal 2007).
Subsequent changes to the human vocal tract might then
have tipped the scales toward speech as the default
modality for language (irrespective of whether these ana-
tomical changes were adaptations specifically for speech
[Lieberman 1984] or something else [Hauser & Fitch
2003]). We remain agnostic with regard to these questions
of language origin, but we note that – perceptuo-motor
differences notwithstanding – there is considerable over-
lap in mechanisms between spoken and signed languages
that would allow for much similarity in the thought-
based, cognitive, and pragmatic constraints imposed on
their evolution (as outlined in the target article).2
Further highlighting the importance of gesture, Aronoff
et al. point to newly emerging sign languages as a source
of evidence of language evolution in vivo. Specifically, they
argue that a key discontinuity between humans and other
primates is iconicity: While nonhuman primates in the wild
spontaneously gesture, they appear never to use gesture to
represent external objects or events. It is interesting to ask
how this difference may relate to cognitive distinctions dis-
cussed by other commentators, including de Ruiter &
Levinson’s communicative intelligence. Perhaps the key to
being able to interpret a gesture as a representation is under-
standing that the gesture is a signal that is intended to convey
a message; and producing a gesture as a representation
requires understanding that the other agent will understand
this intention; and so on. A complementary suggestion is
Corballiss’ proposal that “mental time travel” – the ability
to mentally replay past events, or imagine future events –
may underpin symbolic representation, which allows refer-
ence to items that are not perceptually present.
While Aronoff et al. see iconicity as a starting point for
(signed) language,Dessalles views it as a crucial limitation.
He argues that if language has been shaped by the brain,
then we should expect that iconicity should be maximized,
because this would make learning as easy as possible. Yet,
as de Saussure (1916/1959) observed, relations between
linguistic signs and their meanings are typically close to
arbitrary. We believe this concern can be readily allayed
by noticing that language is selected not just to be learnable,
but also to be communicatively effective (that is, forms
which do not successfully convey their message will be
eliminated). As Namy & Nygaard point out, communica-
tive pressures favor arbitrariness. An iconic representational
system will preserve the similarity relations of the represen-
ted domain in the signs themselves. Although communi-
cation often requires distinguishing between signs for
closely related things, context typically can tell us what a
sign is referring to (e.g., a species of fish, a brand of car,
or a TV show). An iconic system of representation will be
communicatively inefficient if the signs for each type of
object are highly similar, and hence contextually redundant
and difficult to distinguish, both in production and per-
ception. Developing this idea, Monaghan and Christiansen
(2006) illustrate the advantages of an arbitrary, rather than a
systematic, phonology-semantics mapping, in simulations
with a feed-forward connectionist network. Nonetheless,
the model also indicates that systematic mappings may
arise in the service of learning about other aspects of
language (e.g., in the formof phonological cues to lexical cat-
egory;Monaghan et al. 2007). As noted byNamy&Nygaard,
this illustrates the idea of language as adapting to multiple
competing constraints.
Stressing the importance of communication, as well as
learning, in shaping the evolution of language also resolves
another of Dessalles’s concerns. He suggests that if lan-
guages are selected to be learnable, then linguistic complex-
ity will gradually be stripped away, leading ultimately to a
“null” language. But such a language will not evolve, preci-
sely because it would have no expressive power, and hence
would be communicatively useless. The complexity and
diversity of language arise because the primary purpose of
language is rich and flexible communication.
Goldberg raises amore subtle version of the same issue.
Should we expect that, through successive generations,
languages will become increasingly easy to learn? Might
this imply, perhaps implausibly, that Creoles would be
especially difficult to learn? Goldberg notes, though, that
such predictions do not immediately follow, precisely
because language has to simultaneously satisfy constraints
concerning expressive power, and ease of learning and pro-
cessing. The drive for expressive power will typically lead to
greater complexity, balanced by a drive for ease of learning
and processing, which pushes toward greater simplicity.
Note that the constraints from learning and processing
may also be in opposition – and some aspects of language
change may crucially arise from this opposition. For exam-
ple, historical language change involves both processes
of erosion (i.e., reducing morphemes, creating irregular
forms, and thus reducing the load on language production)
and regularization (making learning easier) (McMahon
1994).
But how much of language change is due to child
language acquisition (Bickerton 1984), or is linguistic vari-
ation primarily created and propagated through adult
populations (e.g., Bybee, in press)? To the extent that
child language acquisition is the major driver of change,
the processes of cognitive development are likely to be
important in understanding language change (Toscano
et al.). We are sympathetic to this general perspective
(cf. Karmiloff-Smith 1992), although the current state of
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understanding of the learning and processing mechanisms
across development may currently be insufficient to
constrain closely the theory of language evolution.
Brooks & Ragir also stress the importance of develop-
ment – and in particular the prolonged neural plasticity
that seems especially characteristic of humans. We see
prolonged development as a consequence of the need to
construct highly complex, yet flexible, cognitive functions.
Indeed, to the degree that cognitive development must be
responsive to the particular culture (including the particu-
lar language) to which the child must adapt, a prolonged
period of learning from the environment (whether phys-
ical, social, or linguistic) is surely necessary.
Brooks & Ragir argue that our target article is insuffi-
ciently radical, however. They wish to go beyond our claim
that language does not presuppose a genetically specified
UG, to argue against the existence of genetically encoded
cognitive pre-adaptations for language. To the extent that a
pre-adaptation for language is a mechanism or process that
has adapted through natural selection, but not to support
language, the claim that such pre-adaptations exist seems
relatively mild. Indeed, the various claims concerning cog-
nitive and biological prerequisites for language reviewed
above all seem plausibly to fall into the category of pre-
adaptations. Yet we suspect that Brooks & Ragir’s aim is
not to deny the existence of pre-adaptations. Rather, it is
to deny that the development of any specific pre-adaptation
was the trigger for the creation and evolution of language.
Instead, they suggest that changes in habitat, diet, and social
organization might be more important. To the degree that
language is viewed as a cultural phenomenon, this perspec-
tive seems plausible. Scholars do not seek to identify a
crucial biological change in the hominid lineage supporting
the development of agriculture, fire, or arithmetic – it may
be that this is equally futile in the case of language. None-
theless, language does appear to be uniquely human. Even
if there is no single critical difference between humans and
other animals, it still seems to be an important scientific
project to sketch out the dimensions on which humans
are biologically and cognitively special.
More broadly, the commentators on this target article
have provided a rich set of hypotheses that deserve further
exploration, illustrating the potential pay-off that may be
obtained by attempting to understand language as shaped
by the brain, and thereby countering Piattelli-Palmarini
et al.’s concern that our approach has no explanatory bite.
R5. When can genes and language co-evolve?
Our target articlemakes a narrowly focused argument against
the hypothesis that genes for arbitrary features of language
(as in UG) could have co-evolved with the language itself.
In a nutshell, the concern is that, lacking any functional
pressure to stabilize them, and prior to the existence of puta-
tive language genes, such arbitrary features of the language
will vary. Indeed,we suggest that language change is typically
very much faster than genetic change, and, hence, that the
linguistic environment will provide a moving target, against
which biological adaptation will not be possible. We noted
also that the spatial diffusion of human populations would
be expected to lead to a wide diversity of languages (and,
indeed, human languages appear to diverge very rapidly –
Papua New Guinea was probably settled less than 50,000
years ago, and yet it contains perhaps one quarter of the
world’s languages, exhibiting an extraordinary diversity in
phonology and syntax; Diamond 1992). Co-evolutionary pro-
cesses can, of course, only adapt to the current linguistic
environment – and hence the variety of languages would,
through co-evolution, generate different selective pressures
on “language genes.” Yet modern human populations do
not seem to be selectively adapted to learn languages from
their own language groups – instead, every human appears,
to a first approximation, equally ready to learn any of the
world’s languages (but see Dediu & Ladd 2007).
Although the target article is clear about the narrow
scope of this argument, and, indeed, explicitly notes that
it does not necessarily apply to functional aspects of
language, several commentators take our argument to be
rather broader: to amount to the claim that no aspect of
cognition can be positively selected for language, or even
that co-evolution between any pair of processes is not
possible. In the light of this misreading of our argument,
several points of concern from the commentators can be
set aside.
In particular,Blackmore raises the concern that possible
(although controversial, see Hauser & Fitch 2003) evidence
that the larynx has been adapted to improve speech articula-
tionwould cast doubt on the viability of our argument against
the co-evolution of language and language genes. Note,
though, that improvements in the speech apparatus would
have a positive and general functional impact on language
behavior, whereas genes for UG are expressly for arbitrary
features of language – and it is the latter that is the subject
of our argument. Barrett et al., similarly, develop an argu-
ment that language-gene co-evolution is possible, in prin-
ciple. We entirely agree (see Christiansen et al. 2006, for
simulations of the biological adaptation for functional fea-
tures of language). Our arguments apply only to the viability
of co-evolution of genes for arbitrary features of language,
and Barrett et al.’s counterarguments do not address this.
Fitch puts forward what appears to be a more direct
attack on our position: “If this ‘logical problem of language
evolution’ is indeed as severe as C&C claim, it is not just
linguists who should be worried: any biologist interested
in adaptation to a rapidly changing environment (e.g., indi-
vidual learning) or culturally transmitted system (e.g., bird
or whale song) should be alarmed.” The first case does
not seem directly relevant. Fitch notes that adaptation to a
rapidly changing environment typically leads to “generalist”
species (e.g., rats) whose behavior is highly responsive to
the environment; the natural parallel would be to assume
that language learners would be generalists, able to deal
with a broad range of linguistic environments. But, before
the putative UG is established, early languages will not
exhibit any specific set of arbitrary constraints – and hence,
to deal with this range of languages, the generalists will not
embody such constraints either. So this line of reasoning
seems to lead directly to the conclusion for which we are
arguing.
The case of learned bird- and whalesong appears more
directly analogous to language (see alsoPagel&Atkinson).
Fitch points out that biologists agree that the songs of some
species of birds are culturally transmitted, but within
sharply defined limits. Moreover, he notes, biologists agree
that birds have an innate propensity (“instinct”) to acquire
the song type specific to their species (Marler 1991). This
seems analogous to the case of human language: Language
Response/Christiansen & Chater: Language as shaped by the brain
544 BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (2008) 31:5
is culturally transmitted, and people may have an inherent
disposition to acquire human languages. Fitch may perhaps
suspect that we do not accept that people have any such
innate propensity for language – but, in the weak sense of
the term “relevant” here, our position entails that there is
indeed a genetic basis for language, in the form of a range
of pre-adaptations (perceptuo-motor, communicative, cog-
nitive, and so on). We deny, though, that there is a geneti-
cally encoded language-specific UG; and we explain the
viability of acquisition, and the structure of the world’s
languages, in the light of the adaptation of language to this
genetic basis. Goldberg’s quote from Liz Bates puts the
point well: “It’s not a question of Nature vs. Nurture; the
question is about the Nature of Nature” (Bates 1993).
Fitch goes on to develop an argument that comes danger-
ously close to undercutting his position. He agrees that rapid
cultural changes imply that genetic changes (whether in the
bird or human case) will only be positively selected for prop-
erties that are stable across that cultural environment – this
is the “generalist” strategy, mentioned earlier. But prior to
the existence of language-specific genetic constraints, arbi-
trary properties of language, such as those in a putative
UG, will precisely not be stable: they have (by assumption)
as yet no genetic basis; and (also by their presumed arbitrari-
ness) they have no functional role to ensure they dominate
the cultural environment. Hence, the arbitrary constraints
of UG will be just the kinds of features that will not be
genetically internalized.
Barrett et al. also observe, rightly, that co-evolution
between language and genes is possible, noting that even a
fast-changing environment will have statistical properties
which may, to some degree, provide selectional pressure on
learners. As they point out, co-evolution appears widespread
in biology (e.g., Futuyma & Slatkin 1983). There are, more-
over, some well-attested cases of co-evolution between
culture and genes. For example, the development of arable
agriculture and dairying appear to have co-evolved with
genes for the digestion of starch (Perry et al. 2007) and
lactose (Holden & Mace 1997). Note that these cases are
examples of stable shifts in the cultural environment – for
instance, once milk becomes a stable part of the diet, there
is a consistent positive selection pressure in favor of genes
that allow for the digestion of lactose. These cases are entirely
consistent with our position: Co-evolution can and does
occur where culture provides a stable target. But this could
not be the case for the putative arbitrary regularities pre-
sumed to be encoded in UG. We concur with Barrett et al.
that the broader project of understanding what cognitive
mechanisms may have been positively selected for because
of their role in language acquisition and use (e.g., de Ruiter
& Levinson’s communicative intelligence; increased memory
capacity allowing a large vocabulary [Landauer]; or the
structure of the vocal apparatus, mentioned by Black-
more, and so on) is an important direction for future work.
Several commentators note that our arguments rest
on the assumption that language changes more rapidly
than genes and that this assumption is open to question
(Behme; Blackmore). Pagel & Atkinson report some
important recent analyses which suggest that some aspects
of language may change surprisingly slowly. The Indo-
European language group shows common aspects of voca-
bulary over many thousands of years, as shown both by
traditional linguistic analysis and modern statistical
methods (Pagel et al. 2007). Nonetheless, these languages
have gone through spectacular divergences and reorganiz-
ations, which scarcely count as a stable linguistic environ-
ment over either time or space. Moreover, while, as Pagel
& Atkinson point out, the lactose gene may have become
established over a period of thousands of years, it is un-
likely that a single gene would be responsible for establish-
ing an arbitrary linguistic regularity, such as some aspect of
the binding constraints. This would suggest that an even
longer period of stability in the target language would be
required for the relevant genes to become established.
Overall, we suggest that our assumption that languages
change faster than genes is a good first-order approxi-
mation – and this creates substantial difficulties for co-
evolutionary accounts of the origin of UG. Nonetheless,
Pagel & Atkinson’s arguments raise the possibility that
this assumption is not always correct, and suggest that
further analysis may be required to see if there are
limited circumstances where language-specific arbitrary
constraints might become established.
A number of commentators point to specific evolution-
ary mechanisms that, they suggest, might extend or com-
plicate our argument somewhat. Behme notes that our
argument may be strengthened by the observation that
language users need to coordinate with each other – a dra-
matic grammatical “advance” for a single agent might not
confer selectional advantage. It would, one might say, be
comparable to being the only person to own a telephone,
which is useless unless there is someone with whom to
communicate.
Behme further suggests that powerful forces of sexual
selection may change the argument in favor of biological
adaptations for language by analogy with the male peacock’s
impressive tail feathers (see also Dessalles). Indeed, the
males of many species of songbirds use their vocal prowess
to attract females and defend their territory, and have
clearly been subject to sexual selection (e.g., Catchpole &
Slater 1995). Crucially, however, such sexual selection has
resulted in considerable sexual dimorphisms in the neural
systems for song, with males having substantially larger brain
areas for song control (e.g., MacDougall-Shackleton & Ball
1999). Similarly, sexual selection for language ability in
humanswould also be expected to lead to sexual dimorphisms
in the brain areas involved in language, but there is no evi-
dence for such neural differences favoring male linguistic
ability. If anything, human females tend to acquire language
earlier than males (e.g., Dionne et al. 2003) and to become
more proficient language users (e.g., Lynn 1992). Thus, it
would seem that sexual selection is unlikely to be a major
determinant of any biological adaptations for language.
Hurford argues that the mechanism of “Baldwinian
niche construction”may provide a route for the co-evolution
of genes for some, albeit limited, language-specific knowl-
edge or mechanisms. Perhaps some change in the structure
of hominid social groups (e.g., group size)may have changed
the “niche” in which communication occurs; and this might
itself have altered the dynamics of language change and the
selectional pressures on cognitive machinery co-opted for
language processing. If this is right, then the triggers for
the initial creation of language may have been social,
rather than biological, change (as Brooks & Ragir also
argue). Hurford suggests, in line with our target article,
that it is possible that functional (rather than arbitrary) featu-
res of languagemight subsequently co-evolve with language,
and he highlights large vocabulary, double articulation, and
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long-distance dependencies as possible language-specific
structures. We welcome these specific proposals, and see
them as valuable pointers to guide future empirical work.
Smith et al. suggest that our argument that arbitrary
aspects of language cannot become genetically fixed by
co-evolution applies equally well to functional aspects of
language. They cite important recent formal analyses by
Kirby et al. (2007), which indicate that, if learners choose
the most probable language, given the linguistic data to
which they have been exposed, then the ordering, but
not the strength, of their prior biases, determines the
distribution of languages that arise from cultural transmis-
sion. Smith et al. raise the concern that, in this type of case,
there may be no pressure of natural selection on the more
“desirable” priors – and hence that genes that influence
such priors may be “shielded” from processes of natural
selection. We suggest that this conclusion need not follow,
however. The space of possible grammars (or, more broadly,
hypotheses concerning linguistic structures) is vast; and
hence the number of possible orderings of prior probabil-
ities across this space is enormous. If genes influence this
ordering, rather than the precise numerical values of the
priors for each element in the ordering, this gives plenty
of scope for enormous genetic influences on the speed of
learning, and hence provides scope for strong selectional
pressure on genes. Thus, if functional features of language
provide stable constraints on the linguistic environment,
then there could, we suggest, be strong pressures of
natural selection on genes determining the ordering of
priors over different grammars. Hence, we currently see
in principle no reason to rule out the co-evolution of lan-
guage and language genes for functional (though not arbi-
trary) constraints on language. Nonetheless, we suggest
that additional experimental, computational, and theoretical
work is required to clarify the circumstances under which
such co-evolution is possible.
R6. Where next?
A decade ago, Lewontin (1998) painted a bleak picture
of evolutionary accounts of language and cognition as
being “nothing more than a mixture of pure speculation
and inventive stories” (p. 111). In the target article, we out-
lined the beginnings of a new synthesis for theorizing
about the relationship between brains, genes, and lan-
guage, emphasizing the role of cultural evolution. This
perspective views language evolution as primarily a matter
of cultural, rather thanbiological, evolution; and suchevolu-
tion is seen as continuous with processes of historical
language change, such that selection among linguistic
forms is driven by constraints concerning cognition, com-
munication, learning and processing, and the structure of
the perceptuo-motor system. These selectional pressures
can be studied directly by analyzing the neural, cognitive,
and social basis of language in modern humans, by explor-
ing the impacts of different patterns of social transmission
of linguistic patterns, and by analyzing contemporary and
historical language change. The positive and constructive
spirit of the commentaries gives us grounds for optimism
that a synthesis drawing together these, and related, per-
spectives, is not merely attainable in principle, but is also
likely to be of considerable scientific potential. Thus, the
commentaries have highlighted a range of key areas for
future work, and some important theoretical challenges.
In this concluding section, we draw together these issues
and identify central remaining open questions.
R6.1. Reconnecting synchronic and diachronic
linguistics
We argued, in the target article, that grammaticalization and
other processes of linguistic change are likely to provide
much insight into language evolution. In a similar vein, we
find that some of the key observationsmade by the commen-
tators based on synchronic language data could be strength-
ened and emphasized by embedding them in a diachronic
perspective. For example, Tallerman’s discussion of the
typological patterns of case-marking as an example of lin-
guistic adaptation could be further corroborated by incor-
porating diachronic data to explore the patterns of change
over time, perhaps revealing more about the specific cogni-
tive constraints involved. This point is underscored by
Aronoff et al., who describe how their study of in vivo
changes in Al-Sayyid Bedouin Sign Language and Israeli
Sign Language has highlighted the importance of body-
based perceptuo-motor constraints on diachronic change.
More generally, as noted in the target article, the combi-
nation of diachronic and synchronic analyses in past work
has tended to show how apparently “arbitrary,” language-
specific linguistic universals might derive from general, cog-
nitive constraints. The implication of this line of argumenta-
tion goes beyond theories of language evolution to the theory
of language itself. For example, it seems that construction
grammar may provide a much more suitable formal
approach to capturing the properties of language than gen-
erative grammar in its various guises.
R6.2. Dynamics of linguistic and cultural change
Several commentators stress the importance of cultural
dynamics in shaping language, some arguing that the social
structures underpinning language transmissions fromgener-
ation to generation may be as important as the cognitive and
biological machinery of the language learner in determining
the emergence and evolution of language. Smith et al.
report computational models of language evolution, which
illustrate the interdependence of assumptions about learners
and mechanisms of transmission (Smith & Kirby 2008);
Caldwell illustrates how cultural transmission can be
studied in the laboratory. We suggest that there is much
foundational theoretical work to be done in understanding
the co-evolution of genes-for-learning and the structure of
the to-be-learned domain, whether this domain is language
or some other aspect of human culture. Only with such
work in place will it be possible to assess the scope of the
arguments presented here (e.g., whether functional aspects
of language canbecomegenetically embedded) and todeter-
mine how far our negative conclusions concerningUGmight
extend to putatively innate “grammars” in other cultural
domains (e.g., morality; Hauser 2006). This work is required
in order to extend existing theories of co-evolution (without
learning or cultural change; Thompson 1994) and cultural
evolution (without genetic change; Boyd&Richerson 2005).
R6.3. Relevance to language acquisition
The target article notes that language change, and conse-
quently language evolution, may be importantly shaped
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by language development, although language change in
adults is also likely to be important (Bybee, in press).
Toscano et al. and Brooks & Ragir elaborate on the
importance of developmental processes embedded in a
social context. Moreover, the target article noted that if
language is shaped by the brain, the problem of language
acquisition may be far less daunting than is typically assu-
med: Language has been shaped to be learnable from the
noisy and partial input that children receive. Therefore,
language will embody the (typically non-language-specific)
biases or constraints the child brings to the problem of
language acquisition. This dramatically reduces the impact
of the POS argument, which is still used as a key motiv-
ation for UG (Harnad). These issues are explored in
more detail in Chater and Christiansen (submitted).
R6.4. Revisiting the multiple constraints on language
evolution and acquisition
The commentators elaborate and expand upon the four
types of constraints (thought, perceptuo-motor, cognition,
and social-pragmatic) on language evolution discussed in
the target article, indicating that this framework is pro-
ductive. Somehighlight specific aspects of thoughtprocesses
which may underpin language, such as mental time travel
(Corballis) and double-scope blending (Fauconnier &
Turner); some focus on perceptuo-motor constraints,
including the importance of embodiment (Aronoff et al.)
and the structure of actions (Greenfield & Gillespie-
Lynch). Lieberman sees language as built upon a neural
system for complex and flexible action sequences, underpin-
ning the cognitive aspects of language processing and learn-
ing (Namy & Nygaard). Finally, several commentators
stress the social-pragmatic forces that shape language, focus-
ing on social interaction (Wallentin & Frith), communica-
tive intelligence (de Ruiter & Levinson), and speech acts
(Enfield). As noted in the target article, one of the major
challenges for future research is to understand the many
facets of each type of constraint, and how these constraints
interact to shape the evolution of language.
R6.5. What makes humans special?
If the mechanisms shaping language evolution are to a
large extent not specific to language, then what differen-
tiates human cognition and communication from that of
other primates? That is, why do humans have languages
whereas other primates do not? Across the commentaries,
there is a continuum of views, from the reiteration of the
conventional viewpoint that grammatical information is
innate and species-specific (Harnad; Reuland), across
the suggestion that some such information may be a rela-
tively small part of the story (Barrett et al.; Satterfield),
to the idea that cultural and/or developmental processes
are of central importance (Brooks & Ragir; Smith
et al.; Toscano et al.). In considering human/primate
differences, however, it is important to keep in mind
that the absence of language-specific constraints on
language does not necessarily entail the lack of species-
specific constraints. Along these lines, Hurford and
Landauer propose some specific cognitive features that
may be uniquely human, including memory capacity suffi-
cient to store a large vocabulary, double articulation, and
combinatorial operations. Other commentators suggest
that pragmatic machinery for interpreting others’ behavior
may be more fundamental (de Ruiter & Levinson).
Comparative work on primate versus human neural and
cognitive mechanisms, as well as archaeological analysis
and language-reconstruction to clarify the relationship
between biological changes and the emergence of lan-
guage, will be crucial in addressing these issues (e.g.,
Tomasello et al. 2005).
To conclude, we thank the commentators for providing a
stimulating range of perspectives on the target article, and
for their numerous constructive suggestions for directions
for future research. We are optimistic that pursuing these
and related lines of work, across disciplines as diverse as
linguistics, primatology, developmental psychology, and
neurobiology,mayhelp construct anewsynthesis forunder-
standing the complex relationship between brains, genes,
and language.
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NOTES
1. Although others have used the term “the logical problem of
language evolution” to point to evolutionary issues relating to UG
(Botha 1999; Roberts et al. 2005), we are – to the best of our
knowledge – the first to use it as an overarching label for the
combined theoretical issues facing both adaptationist and non-
adaptationist explanations of UG.
2. Of course, differences do exist between signed and spoken
languages relating to the differences in the modality and mode
of transfer of information. This raises the intriguing possibility
that subtle differences in language structure and use may exist
due to differences in the constraints imposed on the mechanisms
subserving signed and spoken languages. For example, Conway
and Christiansen (2005; 2006; in press) have shown that visual
and auditory sequential learning may involve separate modality-
specific, but computationally similar, mechanisms, giving rise to
both qualitative and quantitative differences in the processing of
auditory and visual sequences. Such differences may shape
signed and spoken languages in slightly different ways so as to
better fit modality-specific constraints on sequential learning.
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